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My intention in this piece is to briefly outline a novel hypothesis regarding the 
neurobiological implementation of feature-set binding, the labeling of feature-
sets, and the resolution of linguistic dependencies arising from the cyclic combi-
nation of these labeled objects. One of the numerous motivations for this was 
reading Robert C. Berwick & Noam Chomsky’s (B&C) recent book Why Only Us: 
Language and Evolution (Berwick & Chomsky 2016; henceforth WOU), which 
struck me as moderately comprehensive in its interdisciplinary scope (including 
good critical commentary on recent work in comparative neuroprimatology and 
theoretical biology) but severely impoverished in its range of linking hypotheses 
between these disciplines.  
While the authors are correct to point out that the Strong Minimalist Thesis 
follows the ‘divide-and-conquer’ approach which helps narrow the gap between 
disciplines, their actual implementation of this approach is fairly mild and 
uninstructive. There is lots of talk about how language is “an ‘organ of the body’, 
more or less on a par with the visual or digestive or immune system” and how it 
is “a subcomponent of a complex organism” (p. 56), accompanied by the usual 
discussion of the Newtonian dispelling of the mind–body problem—all of which 
is true, unequivocal, undeniable, but directionless and intensely vague. B&C 
discuss Lenneberg’s early work on language evolution, deeming it “a model of 
nuanced evolutionary thinking” (p. 5), but as Lenneberg (1964: 76) himself noted, 
“[n]othing is gained by labeling the propensity for language as biological unless 
we can use this insight for new research directions—unless more specific corre-
lates can be uncovered”. The absence of concrete linking hypotheses between the 
domains of the life, cognitive, and biological sciences in WOU, and its concern 
with isolated and disparate sources of evidence which lend support to an emer-
gentist model of language evolution, whatever its merits, does not promote this 
kind of cross-disciplinary collaboration. I think that from the perspective of brain 
dynamics, what the authors call the “Basic Property” (Merge) can be explored in 
a number of interesting and fruitful ways, promoting further interdisciplinary 
work and relying on a neurolinguistic perspective which, unlike WOU, goes bey-
ond the cortex and examines the important role of subcortical structures like the 
thalamus and basal ganglia. 
To set the scene for what follows, it is useful to consider the framework in 
Boeckx & Theofanopolou (2015), which highlights the inadequacy of standard 
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cladistic thinking so prevalent in much of contemporary biolinguistics (most 
notably in the FLN–FLB distinction, under which the ‘Basic Property’ was simply 
added ‘on top’ of faculties shared with other species, as if no reciprocal causation 
had occurred). Boeckx & Theofanopoulou “very much doubt that cognition can 
be studied independently of the basic neurophysiological principles that produce 
it”, going against the many ‘Marr Misreaders’, as I term them in Murphy (forth-
coming), who claim that the three Marrian levels need to be studied in a segre-
gated fashion, privileging the computational level.1 For instance, while compu-
tationally distinct, music and language share a number of important algorithmic 
properties such as prediction, synchronization, turn-taking, and oscillatory 
entrainment (Doelling & Poeppel 2015). This seems to emerge from cell assembly 
specializations and distinct rhythmic profiles; language and music have different 
hierarchical processing networks but shared working memory and cognitive 
control systems (Rogalsky et al. 2011). 
Much work in contemporary neurolinguistics appears instead to be effect-
ively crypto-creationist in its monolithic approach to language implementation 
and evolution, discussing it in terms of ‘syntax’, ‘phonology’, and other complex 
categories—similar to an ophthalmologist speculating about the evolution of 
‘red’ and ‘green’. Top-down perspectives, of the kind proposed in WOU, are 
useful up until the point that sufficiently decomposed and generic sub-operations 
and processes have been discovered. But insisting on a top-down perspective ‘all 
the way down’ is inconsistent with both Darwinian and Thompsonian thinking. 
Indeed, the importance of domestication and cultural evolution for language is 
also often overlooked, despite it being known that domestication can directly 
impact computational competence and trigger previously dormant operations 
(Okanoya 2012; Murphy 2015a).  
The lexicalist framework of WOU, and much recent work in linguistics (see 
Boeckx 2014 and Murphy 2015c for critiques), presents a number of obstacles for 
evolutionary theses. Most notably, contemporary neurobiology is far from 
achieving an understanding of representations, and I think focus should instead be 
placed on investigating operations, with set-formation and labeling (a composite 
of object permanence and property attribution) having a much greater potential 
to be grounded in (oscillatory) processes than roots and intransitive verbs. 
Studies of particular oscillations are increasingly being linked to gene sets via 
their neurochemical implementation, and if cognitive capacities like language can 
be causally derived from oscillatory factors then this would serve as an important 
step in narrowing the bridge between cognition and neurobiology.  
                                                
    1  It’s possible to detect a peculiar kind of dualism in the work of Marr Misreaders. To take one 
of numerous examples, Gazzaniga (1995: xiii) argues that algorithms “drive structural neur-
al elements into physiological activity”, suggesting that higher-order entities have causal 
force over neural assemblies. Moreover, in conceptual terms computational investigations 
boil down to input–output schemas, by definition insufficient to understand the biological 
basis of language, despite the common generativist claim that theoretical syntax amounts to 
biology “at a higher level of abstraction”, whatever that means. This argument has always 
felt to me like a totally needy cop-out, similar to someone ditching their A Level physics 
class and, when challenged by their teacher about their absence, replying: “But I’ve chosen 
to write some poetry about gravity while jumping and rolling down the hill in the park, 
because I thought that was a good way of studying physics at a higher level of abstraction.” 
Biolinguistics  !  Forum  ! 
 
 8 
The neurolinguistic approach in WOU relies on outdated assumptions, 
sticking purely to localization issues and answering the ‘How’ question of lang-
uage evolution by just pointing to good old BA44 and 45. “Our general problem”, 
B&C write, “is that we understand very little about how even the most basic 
computational operations might be carried out in the neural ‘wetware’” (p. 50); 
however, a number of recent proposals have attempted to establish intriguing 
relations between brain function and language comprehension (Lewis et al. 2015; 
Lewis & Bastiaansen 2015, among many others). These considerations embrace 
how the brain actually operates (via oscillations and their various coupling 
operations). B&C additionally “(speculatively) posit that the word-like elements, 
or at least their features as used by Merge, are somehow stored in the middle 
temporal cortex as the ‘lexicon’” (p. 159). This ignores well-accepted findings that 
conceptual representations are widely distributed across several regions, even if 
the middle temporal cortex acts as a store for many core representations and a 
crucial memory buffer in phrase structure building (just as how Broca’s area is 
most likely a similar kind of buffer in syntactic computation, and not the “seat of 
syntax” as Angela Friederici has often claimed; see Blank et al. 2016 for evidence 
of distributed syntactic processing).   
B&C’s middle temporal cortex hypothesis relies solely on imaging studies 
which point to regional specialization for particular language tasks, but this 
methodological cut-off point, while typically acknowledged by fMRI experiment-
alists (who can now achieve voxels of 0.8mm3), is side-stepped by B&C, who 
ignore the important language-related activation in non-specialized voxels. No-
one would claim that the responses to tactile sensation in non-selective regions 
are somehow not part of the story of how we become acquainted with surfaces, 
and so a laser-like focus on middle temporal cortex amounts to a severely run-
down neurolinguistic model. When limited to such a narrow view of functional 
(not to mention dynamic) brain activity, it is almost inevitable that one would be 
forced to arrive at bizarre and outmoded models of language localization.  
It is widely assumed that human and animal concepts are composed of 
necessary and sufficient features surrounded by a periphery of ancillary but re-
lated features used to ‘point’ the comprehender in the right conceptual direction 
(grey feathers may be suggestive of a bird, for instance, but are not necessarily 
part of one), and any neurolinguistic models informed purely by imaging studies 
will likely reflect only the implementational regions (and not the neurobiological 
mechanisms) responsible for these peripheral features. I think this point is crucial 
and to my knowledge has not been recognized by the neurolinguistics commu-
nity.  
Relatedly, localization studies impose no constraints on the theory of lingu-
istic or cognitive structure they are putatively attempting to explore. This point is 
somewhat more obvious, but also seems to me unappreciated in the literature. A 
given brain region (say, BA45) cannot ‘do’ anything to shape or directly inform a 
higher-level computational theory, and it can potentially be involved in any 
number of mental functions. Brain dynamics, on the other hand, are by definition 
far more constrained: A single γ cycle, for instance, cannot be claimed to be 
responsible for processing a verb phrase purely because of its narrow temporal 
window. In addition, claiming that a given portion of Broca’s area is “responsible 
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for interpreting word movement” (as is often done) is hellaciously bad biology, 
and only serves to give credit to a syntactic/processing theory rather than contri-
bute to an understanding of brain and language function.2 We spend our time 
well when we reconsider the conclusions of Ojemann (1990), who showed that 
while distinct features of language propagation are strictly localized, such loci are 
temporary and display great individual variability, with the neuronal functions 
changing over time, and so we can only ever conclude from neuroimaging expe-
riments that cell assemblies are active in particular tasks at time T, under condition 
P, and can at best be specified for particular functions.  
The most advanced experimental evidence B&C put forth is Musso et al.’s 
(2003) seminal work on nonsense languages obeying UG principles, which they 
say “elicit normal activation in the language areas of the brain” (p. 106). The mis-
leading term “language areas of the brain” reflects the general level of disengage-
ment the authors adopt towards all the “important biological questions” (p. 1) 
which “arise” from an exploration of the Basic Principle’s implementation in the 
brain. It is certainly odd that B&C can write that “some small rewiring of the 
brain provided the core element of the Basic Property” (p. 107)—without even 
attempting in chapter 4 (putatively focused on brain structure) to cash this out in 
implementational terms. Pointing to a relatively dense, large regional structure 
like the middle temporal cortex and stating that it is where “the lexicon” is 
housed is similar to if Stephen Hawking sat under a dark star-filled night sky, 
pointed very roughly somewhere up at space, and claimed, “There’s a black hole 
over there somewhere”—a statement which tells us nothing about black holes 
nor anything about space. In fact, Hawking would be on much firmer ground 
than B&C, since at least he can provide a theory of his object of study which can 
be embedded within a larger framework of quantum effects. 
The strikingly basic neurobiology and cortico-centrism presented in much 
neurolinguistic work is incompatible with what is known about the brain and its 
principal dynamics. As a novel approach, from the perspective of brain dynamics 
what B&C call “some algorithm” responsible for labeling becomes capable of 
being explored in a number of interesting ways. Neural oscillations might be a 
suitable way of exploring mesoscopic computations across a number of cognitive 
faculties, as is already being done in domains outside of language like working 
memory. Consider a relatively simple example. The model of linguistic 
computation in Murphy (2015d) invokes a number of cross-frequency coupling 
operations, and in Benítez-Burraco & Murphy (2016) current knowledge of the 
linguistic and ‘oscillopathic’ profile of individuals with autism was used to 
empirically test it. It is additionally of interest, for instance, that schizophrenic 
                                                
    2 We might conclude from this that there are really only two types of people in the world: 
neurolinguists and neurolinguists. Too often is the brain used to ‘back up’ a given linguistic 
theory by the former, while general theories of language are sometimes used by the latter to 
support a particular neuroscientific model. Meanwhile, both brain structure and linguistic 
computational competence remain locked in different cells on different floors of different 
prisons, unable to communicate or help each other escape. These approaches seem to con-
firm the beliefs of some medieval philosophers who thought that the insufficiency of human 
logic would result in barriers to naturalistic understanding (O’Meara 1982)—although it’s 
not really human ‘logic’ which is causing the problems here, rather cross-disciplinary preju-
dices. 
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patients showed higher α–γ cross-frequency coupling in Popov & Popova’s 
(2015) recent study of general cognitive performance, despite this co-varying 
with poorer attention and working memory capacities. This is surprising given 
that most studies show reduced left frontal γ in schizophrenia. The reason for 
this may be that the increased phase-amplitude-locking likely results in smaller 
‘gamma pockets’ of working memory items (as Korotkova et al. 2010 argue on 
independent grounds) and hence low total γ power. In this instance, the size and 
order of working memory sequences outputted by the conceptual system is not 
optimally compatible with the oscillopathic profile, leading to greater rhythmic 
excitability and yet inhibited linguistic functionality. Global rhythmicity is 
consequently disrupted due to unusually strong fronto-parietal interconnectivity. 
This may represent a genuine neural mechanism of an ‘interface’ between 
syntactically generated conceptual representations and external (memory) 
systems; a significant finding, if corroborated by further experimental work. 
Importing standard assumptions from syntax, we can think of the computational 
system as imposing its own conditions on the interfaces. The shift in perspective 
to oscillatory terms allows us to reformulate this such that the neural ensembles 
responsible for storing representations used to construct phrases require 
particular phase-amplitude-locking levels in order for the interconnected regions 
coupled with them to ‘read off’ their content. Studying what we could call the 
human ‘oscillome’ may provide an excellent way of experimentally investigating 
what kind of features can ‘pass through’ the interfaces, and because each rhythm 
plays numerous, non-overlapping roles, it is crucial for these oscillopathic studies 
to be accompanied by biophysical modeling and computationally explicit meso-
scopic frameworks of regionally localized cross-frequency coupling functionality.  
Over the past couple of years, the oscillation literature has shown great 
promise in exploring some major topics in linguistics (Ramírez 2015). Recent 
studies of α have shown that listeners who show better attention-to-memory 
capacities show more flexible α power allocation, leading to the suggestion that 
“selective attention to a specific object in auditory memory does benefit human 
performance not by simply reducing memory load, but by actively engaging 
complementary neural resources to sharpen the precision of the task-relevant 
object in memory” (Lim et al. 2015: 16094). Just as John O’Keefe and colleagues 
have shown that fast γ rhythms can compute vectors in the mouse hippocampus 
for spatial navigation (Chen et al. 2013), it may be that this generic oscillatory 
mechanism is employed in the service of constructing language-relevant feature-
sets. The absence of a complete dorsal-ventral stream ‘loop’ in the macaque brain 
(Frey et al. 2014) appears to be only the briefest sketch of the real underlying 
puzzle, and could be incorporated well into a larger oscillomic system invoking, 
among other things, human-specific myelination rates as a way of directly 
modulating the phase and power of oscillations (Pajevic et al. 2014). 
Ding et al. (2016) showed that distinct rhythms entrain to distinct gram-
matical constructs, from words to phrases to sentences, with slow rhythms in the 
parietal lobe, superior temporal gyrus and inferior frontal cortex entraining only 
to phrasal and sentential structures, not syllabic ones. There have been many 
quibbles raised recently about the experimental materials, controls, number of 
participants and so forth, as indeed there should be. But there has been little 
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discussion about the actual implications of this study for cognitive and linguistic 
architectures more generally. Following other seminal work by David Poeppel’s 
group on the dynamics of phonological computation (e.g. Giraud & Poeppel 
2012) and Lisman & Jensen’s (2013) hypothesis that items from working memory 
are extracted via θ–γ embedding (which dates to the mid-1990s), we could draw 
up an ‘oscillomic’ hypothesis for the construction of linguistic feature-sets (Figure 














Figure 1:  An idealized model for feature-set retrieval. ‘Q’ denotes Q-feature, ‘T’ denotes Tense 
feature, ‘C’ denotes Case feature, and ‘φ’ refers to φ-features (Person, Number, Gender).  
 
In Figure 1, after inhibition reduces over the θ cycle, the most excitable 
representation would be itemized through low-middle γ, followed sequentially 
by the other, less excitable clusters. This would determine feature-set composi-
tion, completed after the θ phase resets. The ‘lexicon’ may amount to stored time-
frequency profiles, with each item being composed of particular, sequentially 
excited and ‘binded’ feature-sets (although see below for a qualification of this 
term). Recent work (Chomsky 2015) has also argued that linguistic structures can 
be labeled not only by standard categorial labels, but also by φ-features, as in      
[φ …α…[γ …β…]], expanding the oscillomic search range. Derivational feature-
checking (e.g. φ-feature agreement followed by Q-feature agreement within the 
same phase) may arise from the particular sequence of items extracted within a 
given oscillatory cycle. The set of feedforward γ rhythms employed in this model 
would be mostly generated in supragranular cortical layers (L2/3) (Maier et al. 
2010), while hippocampal θ would be generated via slow pulses of GABAergic 
inhibition as a result of medial septum input, part of a brainstem-diencephalo-
septohippocampal θ-generating system (Vertes & Kocsis 1997). The interactions 
between the hippocampus and medial prefrontal cortex necessary to focus 
attention on language-relevant features (considering the conclusions of Lara & 
Wallis 2015 on the role of prefrontal cortex in working memory, which stressed 
the centrality of attention rather than storage) may be mediated through an in-
direct pathway passing through midline thalamic nucleus reuniens (Jin & Maren 
2016). 
External constraints would also influence the temporal serialization of 
feature extraction: Ray & Maunsell (2015) note that the coordination of γ phases 
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across multiple, distant areas is difficult due to conduction delays, mediated by 
myelin thickness and nodal structure. For instance, a conduction delay of only 
5ms could change the interactions of coupled γ oscillators from constructive to 
deconstructive interference (Pajevic et al. 2014); see also Nevins (2016) for related 
discussion of feature composition and motivations for assuming that Number 
and Person features do not combine via symmetric conjunction but rather 
through specific orders, possibly grounded in the above oscillomic mechanisms. 
Finally, while Ding et al. (2016) explored the rhythms responsible for ‘packaging’ 
particular constructions, their top-down experimental approach has its limita-
tions, since the functional role of these rhythms in cognition more generally 
needs to be explored alongside broader research into the oscillatory nature of 
working memory, attention, and other domains necessary for language compre-
hension. 
This idea could be developed through the construction of an ‘oscillomic 













Figure 2:  An oscillomic tree representing the putative rhythms responsible for particular lexical 
and phrasal structures according to Murphy (2015d). ‘TP’ denotes Tense Phrase, ‘vP’ 
denotes Verb Phrase (e.g. ‘swam in the river’), ‘NP’ denotes Noun Phrase (e.g. ‘The man’, 
‘John’), and ‘PP’ denotes Preposition Phrase (e.g. ‘in the river’).  
 
In Figure 2, at the point of v–PP concatenation generated by γ and coupled 
to θ, β maintains previous phrases in memory and embeds subsequent γ cycles, 
permitting the binding of phrasal constituents into a larger structure. As dis-
cussed in Murphy (2015d), α is likely involved in embedding cross-cortical γ, a 
form of set-formation, and is possibly generated in the thalamus (see Crandall et 
al. 2015 for evidence of neocortical control of thalamic gating, enhancing the role 
of the thalamus in higher cognitive functions). Spatio-temporal patterns of 
processing syntactically complex, memory-demanding sentences result in left 
parietal α increases, while higher β was found for long- relative to short-distance 
dependencies (β is more generally implicated in the maintenance of existing 
cognitive sets; Engel & Fries 2010). A possible reason for this is that the greater 
working memory load needed to resolve long-distance dependencies requires a 
higher frequency band to synchronize the cell assemblies implicated in the 
feature-sets of the filler and gap; certain assemblies would be pre-activated by the 
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filler (since dependents share a sub-set of their features). Because γ is modulated 
by cloze probability (Wang et al. 2012), β–γ synchronization may be the central 
mechanism of feature-set binding within phrase structures, with γ being respons-
ible for semantic prediction and feature-binding (compositional meaning) and β 
being responsible for syntactic feature-binding and object maintenance (mono-
tonic labeling).  
Human-specific diverse phase relations (Maris et al. 2016) would also per-
mit a greater degree of featural ‘size’ via the range of cross-coupling information 
gating, and may also permit different φ-features to ‘probe’ in unison (van Urk 
2015). Similar approaches (accompanied by hodological research into the 
pathways responsible for a given cross-frequency coupling relation) could be 
taken to the various monkey oscillomes, attributing distinct rhythms and phase-
locking patterns to particular call sequences (Murphy forthcoming). B&C’s 
observation that syntax appears to operate via structural and not linear distance 
when constructing dependencies may also emerge from temporally distant cross-
frequency couplings, such that an ensemble storing a given representation may 
be more closely coupled (via ‘cycle skipping’, controlling the activation of 
particular cell assemblies; Brandon et al. 2013) to a rhythm activating temporally 
distant ensemble X and not the rhythm responsible for the temporally closer 
ensemble Y. 
In the above model, bottom-up γ would rapidly shift the ongoing set of 
featural representations through a standard feedforward mechanism, updating 
hippocampal θ and the widely distributed inter-areal β. The responsibility for 
linking distinct cortical areas into NeuroCognitive Networks (NCNs; Bressler & 
Richter 2015), or large-scale, self-organizing cortical networks, likely falls to β. 
Bressler & Richter claim that this rhythm plays dual roles, being implicated in 
NCN maintenance and transferring top-down signals to lower levels in the 
cortical hierarchy (e.g. the γ range). This model is compatible with the need for 
phrases to be labeled via two (domain-general) sub-processes: object mainten-
ance (keeping the constructed set in memory) and property attribution (affording 
the set an independent computational identity), since β would be able to simul-
taneously maintain an object as a cognitive set (via its steady or increasing ampli-
tude) and attribute a specific representational property to it (via top-down feed-
back and transferring prediction signals). 
Similar studies of infant and child language processing will also be crucial, 
since the developmental characteristics of the oscillome are far from well under-
stood. To take one of the very few current examples of this, Schneider et al. (2016) 
recently showed θ and β power decreases in adults at, respectively, left frontal 
and parietal sites and right parietal sites during the processing of ungrammatical 
sentences. These global(ur), dynamic concerns also speak to Gallistel & Matzel’s 
(2013) assessment that, as a fundamental mechanism of synaptic transmission, 
the properties of long-term potentiation cannot explain the properties of associ-
ative learning and memory. As Fitch (2014: 392) writes, we should be “under no 
illusions that the theory of computation, with its stacks and queues and rewrite 
rules, provides anything even close to a final model of biological computation”. 
Along with being able to describe how the brain performs large-scale inter-
regional computations (potentially moving towards alleviating Fitch’s anxiety), 
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oscillomic phase hierarchies may support the extraction of morphological repre-
sentations (see Leong & Goswami 2015 for related discussion).  
In modern humans, there is increased fronto-cortical connectivity and a 
more developed role for the subplate in achieving this, which likely altered the 
structural and functional role of cortical γ oscillations. The evolution of the sub-
plate additionally aids language network inter-connectedness, which relies not 
only on axon pathways but on the synchronous firing of cortical cell assemblies 
transmitting information between each other (although in what format this 
‘information’ is stored remains unclear). This gives rise to γ, essential for higher 
cognition. Relatedly, fast-spiking interneurons such as chandelier cells play an 
enhanced role in humans relative to other species, aiding the cortex in 
transmitting longer sequences of information (Molnár et al. 2008). Different 
interneurons can compete to generate the same γ rhythm, as Clowry (2014: 227) 
summarizes:  
 
The degree of involvement of each cell type dictates the frequency of the 
network rhythm within the gamma band. This ability to switch between 
frequencies opens up the possibility for a group of neurons to bind with 
different neuronal assemblies depending on which frequency channel was 
in operation. Potentially, the greater the repertoire of interneurons present, 
the greater is the potential number of channels of communication.  
 
There is a dense literature, then, on the functional role of brain rhythms in a 
number of cognitive domains, and which could inform major debates in the field. 
For instance, Jensen et al.’s (2012) approach to the visual system’s prioritization 
of salient unattended stimuli claims that γ rhythms phase-lock to posterior α- 
and β-oscillating regions to form a clocking mechanism sequentially activating 
particular visual representations, such that object X in a given scene is interpreted 
before object Y, imposing general cognitive set-constructing rules of efficiency. If 
similar oscillomic mechanisms are responsible for linguistic feature-set com-
position, then this could potentially provide a way of neurobiologically ground-
ing the principles of Relevance Theory, through which particular representations 
are claimed to be triggered before others due to their ‘cognitive relevance’. Cross-
frequency coupling may consequently be able to connect segmentation/parsing 
with representation decoding/interpretation, with oscillations (implementation) 
being the mechanism to address segmentation (computation) via a phase-re-
setting (algorithm).3 Instead of coming up with new names for the ‘Language/ 
Logic of Thought’ (à la Hauser 2016) or tweaking and re-re-revising the odd 
model of the Italian left periphery and addressing other computational concerns, 
it may be more beneficial (both to linguistics and the brain sciences) if efforts 
were instead made to discard as much of the “attendant logico-philosophico-
mathematical baggage” (Tomalin 2006: 188) carried by modern linguistics and re-
translating or re-embedding only the bare minimum required for hierarchical 
phrase structure building into the rest of the biological and neurophysiological 
sciences.  
                                                
    3  This type of multi-dimensional perspective on language can already be found in Bechtel’s 
(1994) model of ‘mechanistic explanation’, in which different levels of description are com-
posed of discrete entities with causal-explanatory force between each level. 
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This will also undoubtedly ‘free’ linguists from investigating the compu-
tational system from such a narrow perspective. For instance, given the mini-
malist framework provided to him, van Urk (2015) sensibly eliminates the A/A’ 
position distinction and replaces it with obligatory A-features (φ-features) and 
optional A’-features (Wh, Top, Rel, and so forth). But where does this A/A’-
feature distinction come from (a question which seems to me just as problematic 
as how A/A’-positions emerge)? Examining the oscillomic nature of these 
features would deliver a ‘bottom-up’ account of how they emerge and what their 
limits of interaction and generation are. Computational studies can undoubtedly 
(though only partly) direct oscillomic hypothesis formation, but I hope by now it 
should be clear that sticking purely to recycling and refining feature-based 
models of Merge-based grammars will not result in an adequate theory of 
linguistic competence: Syntacticians will simply never be able to know whether a 
given input–output derivational system properly characterizes the human lang-
uage faculty until they explore its hardware.  
Oscillation-based linking hypotheses might also provide a substantive 
response to Revonsuo’s (2001: 51) comment that in contemporary neuroscience, 
“the main efforts are concentrated on the description and systemization of data 
and the utilization of the data for clinical purposes. No radically new theoretical 
purposes, comparable to the neuron doctrine, have emerged from this enterprise 
as yet”. As Snyder (2015) reviews, oscillations are increasingly being shown to 
play a causal, and not correlational role in the perceptual segregation of sound 
patterns (though it should be stressed, as Snyder does not, that numerous other 
oscillatory mechanisms likely do not play a causal-functional role in cognition).  
The unfortunate influence of Marr Misreaders has discouraged linguists 
from engaging with this literature, with cognitive neuroscience oscillation 
research perhaps being initiated properly over a quarter of a century ago by Gray 
& Singer (1989), who discovered that, when multiple features of a visual scene 
were interpreted by an individual as belonging to the same object, the neuronal 
temporal impulses were synchronized in the regions assumed to subserve each 
featural component. I think the potential for these mechanisms to explore, and 
perhaps even constitute part of, the language faculty is substantial; indeed, Gray 
& Singer were surprised by oscillatory coupling at neuronal groups 7mm apart, 
but by now it has been well established that coupling can occur at much greater 
distances, and so the potential explanatory scope of the oscillome has 
dramatically increased over recent years.  
Crucially, the information synchronized by the striate cortex is discrete, 
and so it makes little sense to talk (as is very often done) of features ‘combining’ 
in the brain to form a coherent representation. Similar things presumably apply 
to the present model of linguistic computation: To understand a word is simply 
to comprehend a given set of features, and it is superfluous to invoke an 
additional ‘binding’ mechanism on top of rhythmic synchronization. Cross-
frequency coupling simply is the binding mechanism. The mind is sensitive to 
whichever features cross-frequency coupling operations can excite. Neither 
seeing a table nor interpreting the word table require a further procedure to ‘con-
struct the image of a table’ or ‘construct the meaning of table’. To see a table is not 
to ‘bind’ its legs and arm rests and color and size and edges—it is rather to 
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see/excite these features in synchrony. Similarly, to know a language is not to 
‘combine’ language-relevant features triggered by some modality, it is rather to 
sequentially excite them, yielding a conscious representation which we may, for 
convenience, term a ‘binded’ one. 
Finally, studies of the human oscillome could provide an elegant way of 
grounding some recent proposals about ‘third factors’ in language design. Using 
Laplacian Eingenmodes to analyze MRI and DTI data, Atasoy et al. (2016) 
demonstrate that resting brain function is related to brain shape. They argue that 
“the critical relation between the neural field patterns and the delicate excitation–
inhibition balance fits the neurophysiological changes observed during the loss 
and recovery of consciousness”. The eigendecomposition of the Laplace operator 
may provide fundamental principles permitting a direct macroscopic description 
of collective cortico-cortical and thalamo-cortical dynamics. The spatial harmonic 
waves they observed seem to predict resting state networks and obey the same 
physical principles as other self-organizing phenomena (such as tiger and zebra 
stripes or the patterns of vibrating sand), lending support to Descartes’s original 
intuition that the brain is organized through principles of “efficient causation”, 
and not being incompatible with recent work in generative grammar suggesting 
that syntactic computation operates via principles of efficient computation 
(Narita 2014). 
While most of the topics of language evolution (like language use) do 
indeed remain in the dark, I hope to have shown that some—given the right 
multidisciplinary perspective—are becoming increasingly tractable. If feature-set 
binding, object maintenance, property attribution, featural comparisons, and 
cross-modular searches are experimentally found to be implemented via generic 
oscillomic sub-routines and various cross-frequency coupling relations, this 
would be a substantial step towards understanding the biological basis of lang-
uage. Research into the human oscillome’s neurochemical and genetic basis is 
rapidly expanding, widening the scope for interdisciplinary investigations into 
its lower-level implementation and origins. Although this work is not formally 
described as ‘language evolution’ literature, given the promising directions open 
to oscillomic experimental and theoretical work it may not be all that long until 
studies of thalamic α and frontal γ are considered contributions to the implemen-
tational basis of phrase structure building. An underlying impetus for this bur-
geoning language evolution literature was touched on by Gérard Wajcman, who 
as a Lacanian scholar and a figure far from evolutionary biology consequently 
serves as an appropriately disconnected departure from an analysis of a (current-
ly) disconnected oscillome:  
 
We are animals sick with language. And how sometimes we long for a cure. 
But just shutting up won’t do it. You can’t just wish your way into 
animality. So it is then, as a matter of consolation, that we watch the animal 
channels and marvel at a world untamed by language. The animals get us to 
hear a voice of pure silence. Nostalgia for the fish life […] We record whales 
singing their whale songs capable of transmitting messages to other whales 
thousands of kilometers away, but in truth, brandishing our microphones, 
we only aspire to one thing—that those whales would sing us a song. 
(Wajcman 2009: 131) 
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